The Glorious Saga of the Indian Army

The Glorious Saga of the Indian Army

शूराबद्धु लोकस्य लभते पुनरपि सदा।

तस्मात् सर्वस्य लोकस्य शूरः सम्मानमर्हति॥

न हि शौर्यात् परं किंचित् त्रिलोकेषु विद्यते।

शूरः सर्वं पालयति सर्वं शौर्ये प्रतिष्ठितम्॥

The world endures upon the strength of the brave, as a child rests securely in the arms of his father. Therefore, the warrior—steadfast in courage and duty—stands worthy of honour under all circumstances. Across the three worlds, nothing surpasses valour. The hero protects all, sustains all, and upon his courage rests the very order of existence.

(Mahabharata, Shanti Parva, 99.17–18)

Ancient Indian seers regarded gallantry in battle as the most direct path to the divine realm. The Mahabharata affirms that the celestial abode of Indra is reserved for those who embrace death on the battlefield in the fulfilment of duty. In the great war of Kurukshetra, Sri Krishna exhorted Arjuna to fight without hesitation—victory would earn him the pleasures of the earth; martyrdom would grant him eternal glory in heaven. For the Indian warrior, there existed no third course—only duty.

This uncompromising creed of honour and sacrifice has guided Indian warriors through the ages.

With Independence on 15 August 1947, the Republic of India adopted “Satyameva Jayate”—Truth Alone Triumphs—as its national motto. Since that historic moment, Indian soldiers have fought relentlessly in defence of truth, justice, and the sovereignty of the nation. This chapter serves as the prologue to innumerable acts of valour performed by Indian soldiers in battle, often at the cost of their lives.

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Operations in Jammu and Kashmir (1947)

From its inception, Pakistan pursued the forcible annexation of Jammu and Kashmir. When political coercion and economic pressure failed to compel the Dogra ruler to accede, Pakistan orchestrated a tribal invasion under military supervision. Regular formations of the Pakistan Army were covertly deployed to support this operation: the 7 Infantry Division was positioned at Murree and Abbottabad, while an Infantry Brigade stood by at Sialkot to advance on Jammu at short notice. The operation was code-named “Gulmarg.”

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Blunting the Invasion

At dawn on 22 October 1947, tribal raiders crossed the Kashmir frontier. In rapid succession, they seized Muzaffarabad, Domel, and Uri. At Uri, state forces mounted a resolute defence, holding the raiders at bay for four crucial days. Their determined resistance proved decisive in preventing the immediate fall of the Valley.

On 26 October, the raiders entered Baramula, where they unleashed a campaign of indiscriminate violence, looting, and atrocities against civilians. Ironically, the very plunder they accumulated slowed their advance—buying India invaluable time.

Meanwhile, following the signing of the Instrument of Accession, Indian forces were mobilised with urgency. On 27 October, troops of 1 Sikh, deployed at Gurgaon, were airlifted to Srinagar. Colonel D. R. Rai, commanding the battalion, swiftly secured the airfield and advanced towards Baramula to delay the enemy. Encountering overwhelming opposition, he fought on while withdrawing and was eventually martyred—setting an early and enduring example of supreme sacrifice.

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Battle of Badgam – Defence of Srinagar

The decisive engagement in the defence of Srinagar was fought at Badgam, merely two kilometres short of the airfield, on 3 November 1947. In this critical action, ‘A’ Company of 4 Kumaon withstood repeated enemy assaults for six hours, successfully preventing the enemy from overrunning the airfield.

During this battle, Major Somnath Sharma displayed exceptional courage, leadership, and devotion to duty under intense fire—conduct that would later be remembered as a defining example of Indian military valour.

Blunting the Attack

At first light on 22 October 1947, the raiders crossed the Kashmir frontier and advanced with speed and brutality. Muzaffarabad, Domel, and Uri fell in rapid succession. At Uri, however, the State Forces mounted a determined defence, holding the enemy at bay for four critical days. This resolute stand proved decisive; it delayed the invaders long enough to prevent the Valley from being overrun and subjected to widespread plunder.

By sunset on 26 October, the raiders entered Baramula, where they unleashed indiscriminate violence—murder, looting, and grave atrocities against the civilian population. Ironically, the weight of the booty seized at Baramula slowed their advance, buying precious time for the defenders.

Concurrently, following the signing of the Instrument of Accession, Indian forces were rushed to Kashmir. On 27 October, troops of 1 Sikh, then deployed at Gurgaon, were airlifted to Srinagar. Colonel D. R. Rai, commanding the battalion, immediately organised the defence of the airfield and advanced towards Baramula to delay the enemy’s progress. Encountering the raiders in superior strength, he fought while withdrawing. During this action, Colonel Rai was caught in enemy fire and attained martyrdom, exemplifying the highest traditions of the Indian Army.

The decisive engagement for the defence of Srinagar was fought at Badgam, barely two kilometres short of the Srinagar airfield, on 3 November 1947. In this critical battle, ‘A’ Company of 4 Kumaon repulsed repeated enemy assaults and held its ground for six hours under intense pressure. In the course of this action, Major Somnath Sharma displayed exceptional courage, inspiring leadership, and supreme devotion to duty—conduct that would stand as a benchmark of Indian military valour.

Indian Army on the Offensive

On 5 November 1947, Major General Kalwant Singh assumed command of Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. With the immediate defence of Srinagar secured, the initiative now passed to the Indian Army. The moment had arrived to take the battle to the enemy.

An offensive was launched by 161 Infantry Brigade, which had been inducted into the Valley on 7 November. A hard-fought engagement followed at Shalateng, approximately six kilometres from Srinagar, where the enemy suffered a decisive defeat. Maintaining relentless pressure, Indian troops pursued the withdrawing raiders—advancing to Baramulaby the morning of 8 November and reaching Uri by 10 November.

In the latter half of the month, the brigade successfully despatched a battalion to relieve the besieged Poonch garrison, overcoming difficult terrain and enemy interference. Throughout these operations in the Uri–Poonch sector, detachments of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) based at Srinagar and Amritsar provided vital air support. The brigade subsequently held Uri firmly through the severe winter months.

Simultaneously, the situation intensified in the Jammu–Poonch sector. On 16 November, the Jammu Column of 50 Parachute Brigade advanced to relieve State Force garrisons at Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch, Jhangar, Naushahra, Bhimber, and Rajouri, all of which faced encirclement by Pakistani raiders. Despite serious communication difficulties and hostile conditions, the column accomplished its mission with determination and success.

The enemy, however, responded with renewed aggression. On the night of 23–24 December, approximately 6,000 raiders attacked the Jhangar garrison, forcing Indian forces to withdraw to Naushahra. Their subsequent assault on Naushahra was decisively repulsed, aided by timely and effective support from RIAF fighter aircraft.

The defence of Naushahra remained precarious as long as Kot, a dominating hill feature to its north, remained in enemy hands. Accordingly, 50 Parachute Brigade launched a deliberate attack on 1 February, supported by artillery and air power. The raiders resisted fiercely, but by 1000 hours, Kot was firmly secured by Indian forces.

In retaliation, the enemy mounted a massive counter-attack on 6 February, targeting Indian positions at Tain Dhar and Kot. At Tain Dhar, Naik Jadunath Singh of 1 Rajput, manning a forward picket, displayed extraordinary gallantry and indomitable courage under intense enemy fire. The attack was beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy.

Pressing their advantage, Indian forces resumed the advance and recaptured Jhangar on 18 March 1948, restoring control over a critical sector.

During April, the Indian Army fought two significant actions. In the Jammu sector, Dogra troops captured the Barwali Ridge and advanced towards Chingas. During this advance, Second Lieutenant R. R. Rane of the Corps of Engineers, along with his field company, played a decisive role by clearing heavily defended roadblocks under fire. In another major success, Jat and Kumaon units relieved Rajouri on the evening of 12 April, saving countless civilian lives.

In the northern sector, 3 Garhwal Rifles, advancing from Baramula, drove the enemy out of the area between Limber Nala and Kopra by 16 March, further consolidating Indian control.

Together, these sustained and coordinated operations marked the decisive transition of the Indian Army from defence to offence—demonstrating superior leadership, endurance, and battlefield resolve in the face of determined opposition.

The Summer Offensive

In early May 1948, Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir were comprehensively reorganised to prosecute sustained offensive operations. The Northern Sector, extending from Uri to Leh, was placed under Uri Division (later redesignated 19 Infantry Division), commanded by Major General K. S. Thimayya. The Western Sector, stretching from Rajouri to Jhangar, was entrusted to 2 Airborne Division (later 26 Infantry Division), under Major General Atma Singh. Overall operational control of these campaigns rested with Lieutenant General K. M. Cariappa, GOC-in-C, Western Command.

To facilitate the reorganisation and maintain operational momentum, 77 Parachute Brigade was inducted to relieve 161 Infantry Brigade, enabling the latter to be redeployed for offensive tasks.

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Success in the West

The Summer Offensive commenced on 20 May 1948, with 161 Infantry Brigade advancing along the Uri–Domel axis. In a deliberate diversionary manoeuvre, 163 Infantry Brigade simultaneously advanced from Handwara towards Tithwal, drawing enemy forces away from the main thrust.

The offensive achieved notable success and so unsettled the adversary that Pakistan was compelled to commit regular army units openly in support of the raiders. This direct intervention curtailed some of the gains achieved by 161 Brigadealong the Uri–Domel road. 163 Brigade, however, registered significant and sustained success in the Tithwal sector, securing tactically important ground and consolidating Indian positions.

In the Western Sector, a link-up with the besieged Poonch garrison was effected on 22 June. However, owing to inadequate troop strength to hold the corridor, the linking forces were compelled to withdraw to Rajouri, limiting the immediate strategic benefit of the operation.

During renewed enemy attacks on Jhangar—which had been recaptured by Indian forces in March—Brigadier Usman, a distinguished and inspirational leader, was killed in action on the night of 3 July 1948. His death marked a grievous loss and stands as a testament to the supreme sacrifices made by Indian commanders and soldiers in the defence of the nation.

Containing the Northern Thrust

While Indian forces were making steady gains in the western sector, the enemy sought to outflank the Valley from the north, advancing through the Gilgit axis. By late April 1948, raiders had passed through Gurais and reached the vicinity of Wular Lake, posing a grave threat to the heart of Kashmir. Their eviction demanded sustained and coordinated effort, particularly in terms of airlift, logistics, and engineering support under extreme terrain and weather conditions. After determined operations, Gurais was recaptured by Indian forces on 28 June 1948, restoring control over this critical northern approach.

The situation was even more precarious further east in the Leh sector. On 11 July, approximately one thousand raiderslaunched a concerted attack on the outposts guarding Leh. The assault was resolutely repulsed through the outstanding leadership and personal courage of Lieutenant Colonel Thakur Prithi Chand and Major Hari Chand, whose actions ensured the security of this vital region.

Despite these successes, the prolonged siege of Skardu eventually took its toll. After holding out for several months under the resolute and inspiring command of Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa, the Skardu garrison fell to the raiders on 14 August 1948. Its loss significantly increased pressure on Leh and emboldened the enemy.

Capitalising on this advantage, the raiders occupied Zoji La and infiltrated into Sonmarg, threatening to sever the lifeline to Ladakh. In response, 77 Parachute Brigade, in a bold and unprecedented operation, reopened the Srinagar–Leh roadwith the support of tanks, overcoming formidable terrain and enemy resistance. The subsequent capture of Dras further strengthened Indian positions and decisively altered the balance in the sector.

With these operations, the northern thrust was effectively contained, and the threat to Leh was finally eliminated—securing India’s strategic hold over Ladakh and reaffirming the Indian Army’s capacity to prevail under the most demanding conditions of high-altitude warfare.

The Last Round

Pakistan never reconciled itself to the setback suffered in the Tithwal sector and launched repeated counter-attacks in an attempt to dislodge Indian forces. In the process, the enemy succeeded in occupying certain tactically important features and maintained constant pressure through harassment and local assaults. During one such action, Company Havildar Major Piru Singh of the Rajputana Rifles made the supreme sacrifice while defending his position, exemplifying the highest traditions of courage and selflessness.

A more serious threat emerged on 13 October, when an enemy force approximately 2,000 strong, supported by artillery, launched a coordinated attack from the west and south. After two days of intense and bitter fighting, the assault was decisively repulsed and the enemy was forced to abandon its effort. In this engagement, Lance Naik Karam Singh of 1 Sikh displayed exceptional gallantry, repeatedly beating back enemy attacks—no fewer than eight times—despite overwhelming odds.

The final and most significant achievement of the Indian Army in the Western Sector was the long-awaited link-up with Poonch. The town had remained encircled by Pakistani raiders for months, and earlier attempts to relieve it had failed. The operation required the clearance of approximately 1,440 square kilometres of enemy-held territory between Rajouri and Poonch. The Jammu Division was launched on this arduous mission during 19–20 September, and after a series of fierce and closely contested battles—particularly in and around Mendhar—the relief of Poonch was finally accomplished on 25 November 1948.

Hostilities continued until the declaration of the ceasefire at 2359 hours on 1 January 1949. With the cessation of fighting, Tithwal remained firmly under Indian control.

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Role of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF)

The Royal Indian Air Force played a decisive and multifaceted role in the Jammu and Kashmir operations of 1947–48. Detachments operating from Srinagar, Amritsar, and Jammu conducted offensive reconnaissance over enemy-held territory and ensured the continuous airlift of ammunition, supplies, and reinforcements to beleaguered garrisons. Air strikes and sorties were carried out over a wide area, extending from Domel to Mirpur.

During the assault on Kot, RIAF aircraft achieved several direct hits on enemy strongholds. In the battles of Naushahra, Tithwal, and Jhangar, timely and accurate close air support proved instrumental in breaking enemy attacks. It was the sustained air effort of the RIAF that prevented Poonch from falling into enemy hands in early 1948. Continuous aerial resupply of food and ammunition, along with the evacuation of casualties, played a crucial role in sustaining morale among both troops and civilians.

A particularly daring and historic feat was the airlifting of two 25-pounder artillery guns to the improvised airstrip at Poonch on 21 March 1948. Offensive sorties were also undertaken to soften enemy positions around the town.

In early July 1948, accurate strafing by RIAF aircraft blunted the enemy advance at Zoji La. The Air Force also maintained supply lines to Skardu, delaying its fall by several months. In the Gurais sector, Tempest aircraft rocketed and strafed enemy positions, paving the way for Indian ground advances.

When the situation in Ladakh became critical, Air Commodore Mehar Singh personally piloted a Dakota aircraft to Leh, inaugurating a vital air bridge. Thereafter, the air transport of troops, equipment, and supplies to Leh became a sustained and routine operation. It has been rightly observed that while the Dakotas of the RIAF may not have won the battle for Ladakh outright, they unquestionably saved it from being lost.

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Cost and Honours

The Jammu and Kashmir operations lasted approximately fourteen months. Indian forces suffered nearly 6,000 casualties, including 1,500 killed, 3,500 wounded, and 1,000 missing. For acts of exceptional bravery and leadership during these operations, five soldiers were awarded the Param Vir Chakra, fifty-three the Maha Vir Chakra, and three hundred and twenty-three the Vir Chakra—a solemn testament to the courage, sacrifice, and indomitable spirit of the Indian soldier.

Operation Polo, 1948

The State of Hyderabad, founded in the eighteenth century by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah, came under British protection in 1798 through Lord Wellesley’s Subsidiary Alliance. With the impending lapse of British paramountcy on 15 August 1947, Mir Usman Ali Khan, the Nizam of Hyderabad, issued a firman declaring the State’s independence. Emboldened by these developments, armed Razakar militias began attacking Indian territory beyond the State’s borders, threatening internal security and public order.

These provocations aroused widespread public outrage across India. On 12 September 1948, Army Headquarters issued the directive to Southern Command to proceed. Operation Polo was thus launched. The campaign was planned as a swift, decisive action; within five days, the fate of the Nizam’s regime and the State was to be sealed.

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The Western Thrust

The principal thrust of Operation Polo was executed by 1 Armoured Division, comprising 1 Armoured Brigade, 7 Infantry Brigade, and 9 Infantry Brigade, advancing along the Sholapur–Hyderabad axis. 7 Infantry Brigade, designated the Kill Force, led the initial advance, attacking Naldurg from the south. Simultaneously, the Smash Force of 1 Armoured Brigade bypassed the main road to strike the objective from depth.

By 0900 hours on 13 September, Naldurg and Jalkot had been secured, overcoming resistance from the Hyderabad State Army and Razakar elements.

While these brigades pressed along the main axis, the Vir Force (9 Infantry Brigade) advanced northwards towards Tuljapur and Osmanabad, and further north-east towards Latur, tasked with destroying enemy strongholds and disrupting organised resistance. The brigade split into multiple columns to conduct systematic clearance operations. At Tuljapur, entrenched enemy positions delayed progress, but the resistance was eventually eliminated. At Osmanabad, however, opposition was more determined; the town was cleared only by the morning of 15 September, with 75 Razakars killed and 184 captured.

Advancing eastward, the Smash Force encountered stiff resistance on 16 September at Zahirabad, approximately 150 kilometres short of Hyderabad. The position was held by two companies of Hyderabad Infantry, supported by large numbers of Razakars and irregulars. Concentrated fire from Indian tanks was required to break the defence. To the north, the Bidar Garrison posed a further threat to the advancing columns. Accordingly, the Strike Force, which had been leading the advance, was diverted to neutralise Bidar. The town was occupied on 17 September without opposition.

At 1700 hours on 17 September, even as Indian forces continued their advance, Hyderabad Radio announced the surrender of the State Army. The Indian Army reached Hyderabad within the next 24 hours. The formal surrender ceremony took place at 1600 hours on 18 September 1948, when J. N. Chaudhuri, General Officer Commanding the operation, accepted the surrender from S. A. El Edroos, Commander of the Hyderabad State Forces.

Operation Polo thus concluded swiftly and decisively, ensuring the peaceful integration of Hyderabad into the Indian Union and reaffirming the authority of the Indian State through disciplined, restrained, and effective military action.

The Eastern Thrust

A parallel advance was undertaken along the Vijayawada–Hyderabad axis by the Eastern Striking Force, comprising 2/5 Rajputana Rifles Group, one tank squadron, and ancillary elements. The force advanced rapidly until it encountered organised resistance near Suriapet at 0830 hours on 14 September. The position was held by 5 Hyderabad Infantry supported by 1 Hyderabad Lancers. After a deliberate and methodical engagement, the enemy position was reduced by 1600 hours. Enemy losses amounted to 35 killed and 50 captured.

Following an air strike, Suriapet was cleared the next morning. On 16 September, a fierce engagement at Narkatpalliresulted in approximately 45 Razakars being killed. The force then advanced on Chityal, its principal objective, which was captured by 0900 hours on 17 September. At this stage, the column stood barely 63 kilometres short of Hyderabad.

While the main body continued along the primary axis, 3 Sikh Light Infantry, supported by a tank squadron, diverged northward towards Khammamett. No significant resistance was encountered in this sector, enabling rapid consolidation.

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The Southern Thrust

Advancing from the south was the Mycol Force, comprising 5/5 Rajputana Rifles Group, Mysore Lancers, and 1 Mysore Infantry. Its primary task was to secure critical railway bridges at Kurnool, Tungabhadra, and Hospet. Kurnool was captured without difficulty, while Tungabhadra was secured after minor opposition on the morning of 13 September.

At Hospet, however, resistance was determined and sustained. Fighting continued until the evening of 17 September. During this period, the Gadag Column (4 Rajput Rifles) threatened the enemy’s rear, compelling their eventual surrender. In these operations, the Mycol Force suffered 16 killed and 54 wounded, while enemy losses ran into several hundreds killed.

Simultaneously, Jaiforce, consisting of 3/5 Rajputana Rifles Group, two companies of 17 Sikh, a tank squadron, and supporting arms, launched a two-pronged advance on Aurangabad on 13 September. The main column advanced along the Nandgaon–Aurangabad axis, while a subsidiary column moved along the Chalisgaon–Aurangabad axis. The main column progressed unopposed until it reached Yerul Hill, held by hostile forces in company strength. In the ensuing action, at least 60 hostiles were killed. The diversionary column met no resistance and linked up with the main force at Daulatabad on 14 September. On 15 September, Jaiforce entered Aurangabad and subsequently dispersed to eliminate remaining Razakar elements.

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The Northern Thrust

In the Northern Sector, the Jabalpur Independent Sub-Area initiated operations in the Jalna area in support of Jaiforce. It also executed subsidiary thrusts towards Hingoli and Chanda to neutralise hostile concentrations. Additional small-scale operations were conducted across various parts of Hyderabad State to eradicate residual Razakar activity.

Throughout Operation Polo, the Indian Air Force rendered invaluable support. Enemy positions were repeatedly engaged from the air, and close air support was provided during several ground engagements. This effective air–ground cooperation significantly accelerated the collapse of organised resistance and ensured the swift and decisive conclusion of operations.

Operation Vijay, 1961

Portugal’s continued refusal to transfer its Indian enclaves—Goa, Daman, Diu, and the Anjidiv Islands—to the Indian Republic led to the launch of Operation Vijay in 1961. Portuguese authorities had earlier suppressed a peaceful Satyagraha in 1955 with force and, by 1961, had escalated tensions by opening fire on Indian coastal steamers and fishing vessels near Anjidiv Island. In view of these provocations and the imperative to restore sovereignty, India resolved to employ military force to liberate the remaining colonial pockets on its soil.

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Goa Operations

On 11 December 1961, 17 Infantry Division, with attached formations, was ordered to advance into Goa with the objectives of capturing Panjim and Marmagao. The principal thrust towards Panjim was assigned to 50 Independent Parachute Brigade Group, advancing from the north. A supporting thrust was to be executed by 63 Infantry Brigadefrom the east, while a deception thrust, of company strength, was planned from the south along the Majali–Canacona–Margao axis to fix enemy forces.

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The Northern Thrust

On the morning of 18 December, 50 Para Brigade Group advanced into Goa in three columns.

• The western column (2 Sikh Light Infantry Group) moved along the Dodamarg–Tivim–Betim–Panjim axis.
• The central column (1 Para Punjab) advanced along the Benastarim–Panjim axis.
• The eastern column (2 Para Maratha) progressed along the Dodamarg–Usgao–Ponda axis.

The western and central columns effectively entered a race to secure Panjim.

The western column, spearheaded by armour, crossed the border at 0630 hours. Despite obstacles, including mines and demolished bridges, the armour reached Betim shortly after 1700 hours without opposition, and 2 Sikh Light Infantrylinked up by 2100 hours. Panjim lay barely 549 metres ahead; however, in the absence of higher orders, the column halted for the night. During the same night, Major Sidhu of 7 Cavalry was killed when Portuguese guards opened fire on an Indian rescue party at Aguada Fort.

On the morning of 19 December, permission was granted to advance. Two rifle companies of 2 Sikh Light Infantrycrossed into Panjim at 0735 hours, thereby securing the city and winning the race for the capital.

The central column, 1 Para Punjab, crossed the border at 0600 hours on 18 December. After advancing along the eastern route up to Bicholim, it turned onto the Benastarim–Panjim axis. The column reached Benastarim at 1730 hours but was delayed by a demolished bridge. Negotiating the water obstacle at first light on 19 December, it entered Panjim at 0830 hours, 55 minutes after the Sikh Light Infantry.

The easternmost column, 2 Para Maratha, advanced along the Sanquelim–Usgao–Ponda axis, reaching Ponda at 1345 hours on 18 December. The town was stabilised, and the column conducted patrols in the Ponda–Benastarim sector, establishing contact with the rear elements of 1 Para Punjab on the morning of 19 December.

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Operation Vijay thus unfolded with speed, coordination, and restraint, culminating in the swift collapse of Portuguese resistance and the successful liberation of Goa—bringing to a close more than four centuries of colonial rule on Indian soil.

The Eastern Thrust

63 Infantry Brigade advanced into Goa from Anmod in two columns. The right column (2 Bihar) progressed along a track, while the left column (3 Sikh) advanced along the metalled road. The two columns linked up at Mollem and thereafter advanced towards Ponda on separate routes. On 18 December, 3 Sikh was held up short of Darbandora, while 2 Bihar pressed on and halted at Candapar for the night. Meanwhile, 4 Sikh, the rear battalion, reached the Candapar river crossing around midnight.

At 0600 hours on 19 December, 4 Sikh forced the Candapar crossing by wading through chest-deep water and, by midday, entered Margao. The battalion then advanced via Verna towards Dabolim, where a number of Portuguese troops surrendered at 1530 hours. Continuing the advance, 4 Sikh moved to Vasco da Gama, where the Portuguese forces formally surrendered at 2030 hours.

With 4 Sikh leading, 2 Bihar also advanced towards Margao. Finding the Sikhs firmly established on the town’s outskirts, 2 Bihar redirected its thrust towards Verna. The enemy stronghold was attacked simultaneously from both flanks, leading to a rapid collapse of resistance. This swift and decisive action enabled 4 Sikh to continue unhindered towards Dabolim and Marmagao.

3 Sikh was placed in reserve on 19 December and subsequently advanced towards Margao and beyond in two columns. On the morning of 20 December, approximately 400 Portuguese soldiers surrendered to the battalion.

A diversionary thrust was executed from the south along the Majali–Canacona–Margao axis by a company of 4 Rajput. This manoeuvre was designed to mislead Portuguese forces regarding the direction of the main Indian advance. The southern column advanced up to Margao, overcoming roadblocks, mines, and demolished bridges, and assisted in restoring civil order. In just 40 hours, 17 Infantry Division brought to an end more than four centuries of Portuguese rule in Goa.

The Indian Air Force provided effective support during the operation. Canberra aircraft conducted bombing missions against Dabolim airfield, while Hunter aircraft struck the Bombolim Wireless Station, further hastening the collapse of organised resistance.

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Daman Operations

Operations in Daman were conducted by 1 Maratha Light Infantry. The battalion launched a pre-dawn attack on Nani Daman from the north, first neutralising the Flying Control Tower and Post 175. By 1700 hours, the forward companies had reached the Garden area south of the airfield, where the battalion consolidated for the night.

At 1100 hours on 19 December, Portuguese forces in Daman surrendered without offering further resistance. Artillery and air support played a significant role in facilitating the rapid advance.

In the Daman operation, Indian forces captured approximately 600 Portuguese soldiers, along with several guns and mortars. Indian casualties amounted to one JCO and three ORs killed, and one JCO and thirteen ORs wounded. Portuguese losses were ten killed and two wounded.

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This coordinated and decisive execution of the eastern thrust underscored the Indian Army’s operational speed, jointmanship, and restraint—bringing Operation Vijay to a swift and conclusive end.

Diu Operations

Diu, the smallest Portuguese possession in India, was assaulted through a two-pronged operation—one thrust from the north-west and the other from the north-east. The north-western advance along the Kob–Forte do Passo–De Covo axiswas undertaken by two companies of 20 Rajput with the tasks of establishing a bridgehead and securing the airfield. This effort, however, was checked by accurately sited medium and light machine-gun fire across the creek, which imposed severe constraints on movement.

Undeterred, B Company, 20 Rajput achieved success on the Ahmedpur–Gogla axis. Replacing a company of 4 Madras, the Rajputs mounted a determined assault and captured Gogla at 1600 hours. Concentrated artillery fire broke enemy resistance, compelling the Portuguese garrison to hoist the white flag and surrender.

Throughout the Diu operations, the Indian Air Force rendered effective support. Toofani aircraft carried out strikes against the citadel and the airfield control tower on 18 December, materially aiding ground forces. On 19 December, C Company, 4 Madras secured Panikota Island, capturing 13 Portuguese soldiers, further tightening Indian control over the area.

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Anjidiv Island

Anjidiv Island, located south of Goa, was assigned for capture to the Indian Navy. The operation was executed by INS Mysore and INS Trishul. INS Mysore provided covering fire, while INS Trishul landed the assault elements.

The initial assault party, codenamed “Rustum”, landed successfully at 0715 hours on 18 December, followed by a second party at 0746 hours. At this juncture, Portuguese troops raised a white flag near Lima Beach; however, this proved deceptive. As the second Indian party approached the shore, Portuguese forces opened fire, causing casualties in a treacherous act.

In response, INS Trishul and INS Mysore delivered sustained and accurate naval gunfire against enemy strongpoints, decisively breaking resistance. Numerous Portuguese troops surrendered on 18 December, with additional prisoners taken on 19 December. At 1425 hours on 19 December, the Indian National Flag was hoisted on Anjidiv Island, formally completing its liberation.

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These coordinated actions in Diu and Anjidiv concluded the final phases of Operation Vijay, demonstrating effective joint operations, resolute leadership, and disciplined application of force in the liberation of India’s remaining colonial enclaves.

Sino–Indian Conflict, 1962

Barely months after the successful conclusion of operations in Goa, India was confronted with a grave military challenge along its northern frontiers. Following the consolidation of its control over Tibet, China advanced expansive territorial claims over large tracts of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA) and Ladakh. To enforce these claims, China established a network of military posts along the Sino–Indian border. When India moved to check these intrusions, tensions escalated into open conflict in October 1962.

China had prepared meticulously for this confrontation over several years. It had constructed strategic roads, developed airfields, conducted large-scale military exercises, and organised Tibet into a fully integrated military district. India, by contrast, was inadequately prepared in terms of infrastructure, logistics, and force posture to meet a large-scale, coordinated assault in high-altitude terrain. The Chinese offensive unfolded along three principal axes: Thag La and Walong in NEFA, and Chushul in Ladakh.

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Attack in the Kameng Sector

The main Chinese offensive in the eastern sector was launched in division strength in the Kameng Sector, south of the Thag La Ridge in the Namkha Chu Valley, on 21 October 1962. Sporadic incidents had already occurred in this area during September and early October. 7 Infantry Brigade, particularly 2 Rajput and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, fought with determination and resolve. Despite their courage, the overwhelming numerical superiority and firepower of the Chinese forces proved decisive. As enemy infiltration threatened their rear, the remaining battalions of the brigade—9 Punjab and 4 Grenadiers—were compelled to withdraw from forward positions.

The Chinese subsequently advanced on Tawang from both the north and west. The town was defended by 1 Sikh and 4 Garhwal Rifles, tasked with holding the northern and western approaches respectively. On 23 October, a Chinese brigade group attacked from the north, forcing 1 Sikh to fall back after fierce fighting. During this action, Subedar Joginder Singh, commanding a platoon south of Bum La, displayed exceptional gallantry and leadership in the face of overwhelming odds. Tawang was evacuated on 23 October, and Indian forces regrouped in the Nurunang Valley.

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Sela–Bomdila Operations

A pause of approximately three weeks followed before the Chinese launched a renewed offensive in the Sela–Bomdila Sector. By this time, Indian dispositions had been strengthened, with 4 Infantry Division deploying three brigades: 62 Brigade at Sela, 65 Brigade at Dirang Dzong, and 48 Brigade at Bomdila. 62 Brigade, comprising 4 Garhwal, 2 Sikh Light Infantry, 4 Sikh Light Infantry, 1 Sikh, and 13 Dogra, under the command of Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, was well sited at Sela to resist an attack.

On 18–19 November 1962, the Chinese launched a coordinated three-pronged offensive aimed simultaneously at Sela, Dirang Dzong, and Bomdila. Through extensive infiltration and manoeuvre, Chinese forces achieved a complete outflanking of Indian positions spread between Sela, Bomdila, and further south. Faced with encirclement, the Indian commander ordered a withdrawal. The retreat, conducted under intense pressure and in extremely difficult terrain, proved disastrous.

Exploiting their momentum, Chinese forces advanced rapidly towards Rupa, the foothills, and Bomdila, creating a serious threat to Tezpur. On 21 November, Tezpur was evacuated by civilians amid fears of an imminent advance. That same day, China declared a unilateral ceasefire, effective from midnight 21–22 November 1962, abruptly ending active hostilities.

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Gallantry Amid Adversity

Despite the operational setbacks and ultimate defeat, the conflict was marked by numerous acts of conspicuous bravery and sacrifice by Indian soldiers. 2 Rajput and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles fought with steadfast courage in the Namkha Chubattles. 4 Garhwal Rifles distinguished itself in the fighting at Nurunang. Many officers and men, including Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, laid down their lives while attempting to break through Chinese roadblocks. Numerous others were lost amid the dense jungles and unforgiving terrain of the Himalayas.

The Sino–Indian Conflict of 1962 thus stands as a stark chapter in India’s military history—one of strategic failure, but also of individual heroism, endurance, and unwavering commitment to duty under the most adverse conditions.

The Attack on Walong

In the eastern theatre, Chinese forces launched a major offensive against the Walong sector of the Lohit Division on 22 October 1962. Indian positions in the area were held by 6 Kumaon, 4 Sikh, and elements of the Assam Rifles. From the outset, 6 Kumaon fought with exceptional determination, inflicting heavy casualties on the attacking enemy. However, sustained pressure from superior Chinese numbers and firepower compelled the battalion to withdraw towards Walong, where 4 Sikh had prepared defensive positions.

On 27 October, the Chinese mounted a concerted attack on Walong. This assault was resolutely repulsed, with the enemy suffering substantial losses. A brief lull followed, during which Indian forces undertook reorganisation and reinforcement. On 31 October, responsibility for the sector was assumed by 11 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Rawlley. In early November, 3/3 Gorkha Rifles was airlifted into the area to strengthen the defence.

Meanwhile, Chinese troops occupied two tactically significant features—Green Pimple and Yellow Pimple—located near the tri-junction to the north-west of Walong. To forestall a potential outflanking manoeuvre from this direction, the Indian brigade launched a counter-attack on 14 November. Despite determined efforts, 6 Kumaon was unable to dislodge the well-entrenched enemy and was forced to fall back to the tri-junction.

On 16 November, the Chinese launched a massive offensive in division strength, supported by heavy artillery. Overwhelmed by the scale and intensity of the assault, Indian positions were penetrated, compelling the brigade to withdraw. As the enemy threatened to cut off the line of retreat, Indian units conducted a fighting withdrawal to Hayuliang, suffering heavy casualties in the process.

In the battle of Walong, 11 Infantry Brigade sustained approximately one thousand casualties, including killed, wounded, and captured. For acts of gallantry during these operations, the brigade was awarded one Maha Vir Chakra, nine Vir Chakras, and one Mention-in-Despatches—a solemn recognition of the courage, sacrifice, and steadfastness displayed by Indian soldiers in the face of overwhelming adversity.

The Attack on Ladakh

A second major theatre of operations during the Sino–Indian Conflict of 1962 unfolded in Ladakh. By 1959, Chinese forces had already occupied Aksai Chin and had penetrated deep into the Galwan and Chip Chap valleys, significantly altering the status quo. When India initiated measures to prevent further encroachments, China responded with a full-scale military offensive.

On 20 October 1962, Chinese forces attacked Indian posts along the Chip Chap River, directly threatening Daulat Beg Oldi. The Jammu and Kashmir Militia, holding these positions, was compelled to withdraw under intense pressure. Simultaneously, another thrust was launched in the Sirijap area, north of Pangong Lake—a sector vital for the defence of Chushul. This area was held by 1/8 Gorkha Rifles in company strength. Despite repeatedly repulsing enemy assaults, the company eventually succumbed to overwhelming force. Major Dhan Singh Thapa, the Company Commander, displayed outstanding gallantry and leadership during this action.

In the October offensive, Chinese forces overran nearly all Indian posts across Ladakh, from Daulat Beg Oldi in the north to Demchok in the south.

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Defence of Chushul and Final Battles

Even as reverses were suffered, India continued to reinforce Ladakh. By November 1962, two brigades—114 Infantry Brigade and 70 Infantry Brigade—were positioned forward of Chushul to confront the expected Chinese offensive. Anticipating an enemy advance through the Spanggur Gap, 114 Brigade was deployed to block this axis. 1/8 Gorkha Rifles occupied Gurung Hill to the north of the gap, while 13 Kumaon held Mager Hill to the south. 1 Jat was positioned north of the Chushul airfield in the Thakung area, supported by limited armour and artillery.

The decisive engagement began on the morning of 18 November, preceded by intense artillery and mortar fire on Indian positions. Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill in successive waves, employing battalion-strength assaults. Despite resolute resistance by 1/8 Gorkha Rifles, only part of the feature could be held, and the remainder fell after renewed attacks on 19 November.

At Rezang La, a company of 13 Kumaon faced a determined three-pronged assault. In spite of heroic resistance and fierce close-quarter fighting, the position was eventually overrun. Major Shaitan Singh distinguished himself by exceptional courage and leadership, laying down his life in defence of the post. With the fall of Rezang La, organised Indian resistance in Ladakh effectively came to an end.

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Air Effort and Aftermath

Throughout the campaign, the Indian Air Force undertook sustained airlift operations, transporting troops, weapons, and supplies to forward areas along the Sino–Indian border. Between 20 October and 20 November, air operations were conducted virtually round the clock, in extreme weather and at unprecedented altitudes—an effort critical to sustaining Indian forces under severe conditions.

The conflict formally ended with China’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire, effective from midnight 21 November 1962. In the aftermath, the Government of India constituted an enquiry committee under T. B. Henderson-Brooks to examine the causes of the military setback. The committee submitted its report on 12 May 1963, leading to far-reaching reforms in India’s military doctrine, organisation, training, and preparedness.

The Ladakh campaign thus stands as a sobering chapter in Indian military history—marked by strategic shortcomings, but also by extraordinary bravery, endurance, and sacrifice by Indian soldiers under the harshest conditions of high-altitude warfare.

Indo–Pak War, 1965

The setback suffered by India in the Sino–Indian Conflict of 1962 emboldened Pakistan to seek a military solution to the Kashmir issue. Buoyed by a substantially modernised armed force—supported in large measure by military assistance from the United States—Pakistan entered 1965 with a misplaced sense of superiority in armour, artillery, and air power. This confidence translated into an aggressive strategy aimed at wresting Kashmir by force.

Pakistan’s design was structured as a three-phase plan.

• Phase One sought to test India’s response capability in the Rann of Kutch.
• Phase Two aimed to weaken India’s grip on Kashmir through large-scale infiltration and sabotage.
• Phase Three envisaged bottling up Indian forces in Kashmir by severing their lines of communication, particularly in the Chhamb–Jaurian sector of Jammu.

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Phase One: Rann of Kutch

The Rann of Kutch is an expansive marshland, approximately 80 kilometres wide and 515 kilometres long, bordering Sind in Pakistan and Gujarat in India. The terrain favoured the Pakistani side, where defences were comparatively stronger, while on the Indian side the border was largely guarded by police posts. Despite earlier provocations at Kanjarkot in January 1965, India did not anticipate a major military escalation in this sector.

On 7 April 1965, Pakistan launched coordinated attacks in brigade strength against Indian positions at Sardar Post, Kanjarkot, Vigokot, Biar Bet, Chhad Bet, and other locations, overrunning the first two posts. India responded by inducting 50 Parachute Brigade to contain the intrusion. Pakistan, in turn, reinforced its brigade with a tank regiment, escalating the confrontation.

On 23 April, Pakistani forces renewed their offensive, capturing Vigokot and Biar Bet after attacking four border posts simultaneously. Hostilities in the Rann of Kutch came to an end on 1 July 1965, following diplomatic intervention by the British Prime Minister. Although neither side achieved significant territorial gains, Pakistan interpreted the episode as a success—an assessment that further reinforced its aggressive intent.

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Phase Two: Infiltration into Kashmir – Operation Gibraltar

Encouraged by what it perceived as success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan activated its plan to seize the Kashmir Valleythrough covert action. The conspiracy, code-named Operation Gibraltar, involved the infiltration of approximately 30,000 raiders (Mujahids), organised into multiple task forces, into Jammu and Kashmir between 1 and 5 August 1965. Their mission was to incite rebellion, sabotage communications, and paralyse Indian administration.

The Indian XV Corps reacted swiftly, implementing prompt counter-infiltration measures. Within fifteen days, the infiltrators were effectively contained and isolated.

To eliminate the threat decisively, the Indian Army undertook offensive actions to seal the infiltration routes. Attacks were launched on Kargil (Leh sector), Tangdhar (Tithwal sector), and Haji Pir (Uri sector) with this objective. To further close the gaps, a link-up with Poonch was effected by 93 Infantry Brigade. In the course of these operations, two strongly held enemy features—Raja and Chand Tekri—were captured on 5–6 September 1965.

Simultaneously, the Mirpur area along the Kishanganga River was addressed by 104 Infantry Brigade. Operations in this sector commenced on 24 August and continued until 21 September, involving a series of hard-fought engagements to establish complete domination of the area.

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Outcome of Phase Two

Through timely, resolute, and well-coordinated action—particularly by 19 Infantry Division—the Indian Army not only neutralised the infiltration but turned Operation Gibraltar into a comprehensive failure for Pakistan. The collapse of this second phase decisively undermined Pakistan’s strategy and set the stage for the escalation that followed, culminating in the full-scale Indo–Pak War of 1965.

This phase of the conflict underscored the Indian Army’s capacity for rapid adaptation, aggressive counter-action, and firm control of mountainous terrain under complex operational conditions.

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The Third Phase

Pakistan initiated the final phase of its strategy with the launch of Operation Grand Slam, aimed at reversing the deteriorating situation. The objective was to defeat Indian forces in the Chhamb sector, thereby enabling the capture of the Akhnur bridge and ultimately Jammu. Success in this endeavour would have severed India’s principal line of communication to Kashmir, effectively isolating Indian forces in the Valley.

The Pakistani offensive, launched in division strength at 0345 hours on 1 September 1965, was backed by comparative superiority in artillery, armour, and infantry, giving it strong initial momentum. On the Indian side, 10 Infantry Division was still in the process of formation. 191 Infantry Brigade, tasked with the defence of the sector, was unable to stem the enemy’s three-pronged advance and was compelled to withdraw towards Akhnur by 4 September.

When Pakistani forces resumed their advance towards Akhnur on 5 September, the situation assumed critical proportions. Faced with the imminent threat to Jammu and the Kashmir lifeline, India adopted a bold strategic response. The Indian Army launched diversionary offensives across the international border in the Lahore, Sialkot, and Rajasthan sectors.

These decisive counter-strokes fundamentally altered the strategic balance. They forced Pakistan to divert forces away from Chhamb, shattered its plan to bottle up Indian troops in Kashmir, and transformed the conflict into a full-scale, multi-front war—thereby bringing Operation Grand Slam to an abrupt strategic halt.

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Lahore Sector

In the Lahore sector, Indian XI Corps launched a coordinated offensive employing three divisions—15 Infantry Division, 7 Infantry Division, and 4 Mountain Division—across a broad front extending from Pathankot in the north to Suratgarh in the south. The frontage was organised into three operational sectors:

• Northern Sector (GT Road axis): assigned to 15 Infantry Division
• Central Sector (Khalra–Barki axis): assigned to 7 Infantry Division
• Southern Sector (Khem Karan–Kasur axis): assigned to 4 Mountain Division

Each division was allotted appropriate armour and artillery to support its tasks. The corps objective was the capture of Pakistani territory east of the Ichhogil Canal. The offensive commenced at 0400 hours on 6 September 1965.

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Northern Sector (15 Infantry Division).

Initial operations progressed favourably. The advance brigade seized Dograi in the opening thrust, established a bridgehead across the Ichhogil Canal, and advanced to Batapore on the outskirts of Lahore. However, these gains could not be exploited. Strong Pakistani counter-attacks, well supported by armour, compelled a withdrawal. A renewed attempt initiated on 10 September achieved limited success. The sector’s defining action was the recapture of Dograi by 3 Jat at midnight on 21 September, during which Pakistani forces suffered approximately 150 killed and 100 captured.

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Central Sector (7 Infantry Division).

Operations in the central sector were executed with speed and determination. Advancing along the Khalra–Barki axis, 7 Infantry Division completed its assigned tasks by 11 September 1965. The hardest-fought engagement occurred at Barki, defended by a dense network of bunkers. In a decisive night action, 4 Sikh broke the enemy’s resistance and captured Barki by 2130 hours on 10 September. The battle was costly, with heavy casualties on both sides.

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Southern Sector (4 Mountain Division).

The southern sector proved the most demanding. 4 Mountain Division bore a dual responsibility: seizing Pakistani territory east of the Ichhogil Canal and containing a major enemy thrust along the Kasur–Khem Karan axis. Although the division achieved early gains, a powerful Pakistani counter-offensive arrested the advance. Indeed, Pakistan had planned a major armoured envelopment in this sector aimed at destroying XI Corps.

Unable to halt the initial shock, 4 Mountain Division withdrew to the prepared defensive position at Asal Uttar. By then, the division was reduced to three and a half battalions, as 7 Brigade had been rendered ineffective in the first enemy blow. However, Asal Uttar was a strong defensive locality, with well-sited artillery and armour. Repeated Pakistani attempts to break through were decisively repulsed.

On the night of 8 September, a Pakistani armoured brigade attempted an outflanking manoeuvre on the right. 4 Grenadiers held firm; in this action, Havildar Abdul Hamid single-handedly destroyed two Patton tanks and damaged a third. A subsequent armoured outflanking attempt from the left along the Mahmoodpura–Dibbipura axis also failed, as Indian armour trapped the attackers from three sides. In the Battle of Asal Uttar, Pakistan lost 97 tanks, including 72 Pattons—a crippling blow to its armoured force.

Indian forces made efforts to recover lost ground in this sector, but Pakistani troops retained their positions until the ceasefire, which denied further opportunities for decisive counter-action.

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Flank Security.

The right flank of XI Corps was secured by 29 Infantry Brigade Group, which attacked and captured Dera Baba Nanak on 7 September.

Assessment.

Overall, Indian XI Corps substantially achieved its operational objectives by securing territory east of the Ichhogil Canal, with the principal exception of the Khem Karan sector. The Lahore-sector operations demonstrated effective combined-arms coordination, resilience under armoured pressure, and the decisive value of prepared defences when faced with massed enemy armour.

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Sialkot Sector

To relieve mounting pressure in the Chhamb sector, the Indian Army opened a major second front in the Sialkot sectorby committing 1 Corps on 8 September 1965. The intent was to draw Pakistani reserves away from Chhamb, disrupt enemy operational plans, and engage Pakistan’s armoured strength on ground of India’s choosing.

As part of the opening manoeuvre, 26 Infantry Division executed a diversionary advance in the north towards Sialkot, fixing enemy forces in place. Simultaneously, 6 Mountain Division attacked along the Charwa–Maharajke axis, capturing the area after determined fighting. Further east, 14 Infantry Division established a bridgehead at Ikhnal, creating the necessary conditions for the induction and employment of armour.

With the ground prepared, 1 Armoured Division advanced on 8 September. Adverse weather initially impeded movement and tempo, compelling a change of axis. On 11 September, the division launched a renewed thrust towards Phillora. While Indian armoured brigades engaged Pakistani armour in intense tank battles, 43 Lorried Brigadeexecuted a bold infantry assault and captured Phillora in a spirited action. In this engagement, the Pakistan Army lost approximately 61 tanks, suffering a severe blow to its armoured strength.

Exploiting this success, 1 Armoured Division advanced towards Chawinda on 14 September. By this time, Pakistani forces had concentrated substantial armour in the area, resulting in fierce engagements and limited Indian progress. Nevertheless, Indian troops captured Jassoran and Batur Dograndi on 16 September. During a Pakistani counter-attack at Batur Dograndi, Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Tarapore of the Poona Horse was killed in action while leading from the front, exemplifying the highest traditions of armoured leadership and sacrifice.

A further attempt by 1 Corps to secure Chawinda on the night of 18 September achieved only limited gains. Despite this, the corps accomplished significant operational objectives. Over the course of the campaign, 1 Corps captured approximately 466 square kilometres of Pakistani territory and destroyed or captured nearly 180 Pakistani tanks, decisively engaging and attriting Pakistan’s armoured reserves.

The operations in the Sialkot sector thus played a critical role in the wider war effort—relieving pressure on threatened sectors, blunting Pakistan’s armoured offensive capability, and demonstrating the Indian Army’s ability to conduct large-scale, combined-arms operations under intense battlefield conditions.

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Rajasthan Sector

To further disperse and immobilise Pakistani forces—particularly those deployed in Sind—India opened a third front in the Rajasthan sector. 11 Infantry Division conducted operations along the Barmer–Hyderabad axis. In the opening sweep on 8 September, Gadra was secured, and Pak Rangers were driven out from several positions across the desert. A series of see-saw engagements followed, characterised by mobile actions in harsh terrain, and continued until the end of hostilities. By war’s end, Indian forces had consolidated additional gains, capturing a total of 388 square kilometres of Pakistani territory in this sector.

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Air Support

The Indian Air Force provided substantial and sustained support to ground operations across multiple fronts. On the opening day of the war, Vampire and Mystère aircraft struck Pakistani armour advancing along the Chhamb–Jaurian axis, delivering early and telling blows. Subsequently, Canberra bombers conducted night raids against major Pakistan Air Force bases, including Sargodha and Chaklala. Additional strikes were carried out against bases at Akwal, Peshawar, Kohat, Chak Jhumra, and Risalwala.

In operational employment, Mystères were used primarily in the ground-attack role, while Hunters undertook counter-air interdiction, close air support, and combat air patrols. Gnat squadrons formed the backbone of air defence. Their remarkable success against Pakistan’s F-86 Sabres earned the Gnat the enduring sobriquet “Sabre Slayer.” Over the course of the conflict, India lost 35 aircraft, compared with 70 aircraft lost by Pakistan.

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Maritime Security

The Indian Navy ensured the security of India’s ports and coastline throughout the war. Although the Pakistan Navy conducted a surprise raid on Dwarka, it caused no damage of military consequence, and maritime security remained uncompromised.

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Casualties and Outcome

Despite enjoying qualitative advantages in certain categories of arms and equipment, Pakistan suffered heavy losses in men and materiel. It is estimated that the Pakistan Army incurred approximately 5,988 killed, with many more wounded. Indian losses stood at 2,735 killed and 8,225 wounded. In armoured engagements, India lost 80 tanks, while Pakistan lost approximately 475 tanks—a decisive disparity.

A ceasefire was agreed upon with effect from 23 September 1965, following efforts by the United Nations. The subsequent Tashkent Declaration and follow-on agreements provided for disengagement and withdrawal of forces to positions held prior to 5 August 1965, restoring stability to the subcontinent for a period.

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This campaign underscored the Indian Armed Forces’ capacity for multi-front operations, effective jointmanship, and resilience under pressure—decisive factors in shaping the conflict’s outcome.

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Indo–Pak War, 1971

Following its decisive victory in the 1970–71 general elections, the Awami League—which commanded an absolute majority—pressed for meaningful autonomy for East Pakistan. The military leadership in West Pakistan responded with a brutal military crackdown, unleashing widespread repression.

The resulting humanitarian catastrophe forced approximately ten million civilians to flee into India, placing severe economic, social, and security strains on the country. India urged Pakistan to create conditions conducive to the safe and dignified return of the refugees to their homes in East Bengal. Pakistan, instead of addressing the crisis, sought to internationalise the issue and escalated matters by launching attacks on India on 3 December 1971.

The conflict that followed was fought on two distinct theatres—the Eastern Front and the Western Front. India adopted a decisive, offensive strategy in the East, aimed at rapidly neutralising Pakistani forces and resolving the humanitarian crisis, while maintaining a defensive posture in the West to contain and blunt Pakistani offensives. This calibrated strategy set the conditions for one of the most decisive military outcomes in South Asian history.

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